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Abstract
This paper utilizes opening and closing betting lines on the day of play in the
NFL to investigate if changes in the spread are a result of uninformed bettors. I
formulate and empirically test the changes in the spread as they relate to home field
advantage, favorites and hot hand betting. The results show that bettors tend to
overvalue information and as a result, the actual scores shift less dramatically than
the spreads on the final day of betting. A profitable betting strategy can be
implemented betting against the shift in the spread. Additionally, it is more
profitable to bet on home underdogs than away underdogs and more profitable to
bet on away favorites than home favorites when betting against the shift in the
spread.
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Introduction
The sports betting market has expanded exponentially over the last ten years with
an estimated market cap of close to 1 trillion dollars (Statista.com). Sports economists
start to pay particular attention to this market in light of its gaining popularity, especially
over the last ten years. The NFL betting market is the largest subsection of the gambling
market overall, so this market receives the most attention from economists with regards
to market efficiency. Economists analyze the stock market endlessly for market
efficiency, as the general consensus is that the stock market is efficient over an extended
time period (McGroarty and Urquhart 2016). However, stock prices are always a
representation of the "collective judgement" of all stock traders. The NFL betting market,
contrarily, provides a concrete value in that there is a final score of every game that
reflects the ability of each team on the given day. As a result, the NFL betting market is a
much more accessible market to analyze for efficiency and given its increase in
popularity, is a necessary topic to explore in sports economics.
The NFL betting market has several components. The three most popular bets are
to bet on the money line, the spread and the over/under. The money line is a bet on a
team to win the game and categorized by either a positive or negative number. If the
number is positive, the team is predicted to lose, and the number represents the money
received on a 100 dollar bet (additional to the 100 dollars placed on the bet). So, if a team
is +100, the bettor receives 100 dollars of profit. If the money line is negative, the team is
expected to win. Therefore, the payout will be much less on a win. If a team is -200, the
bettor will win 50 dollars on a 100 dollar bet (oddsshark.com). The over/under line is a
bet on whether the total score (between both teams) will be above or below the given
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line. The payout for these bets are always one-to-one (the same as +100). The spread line
is a predicted score difference (away-home) on the game. So if a bettor places a bet on
the home team and the spread is -9, the home team must win by more than 9 to win the
bet. In both over/under betting and spread betting, if the prediction is exactly the same as
the result, there is a "push," which means that all bettors get their money back. To combat
this result, bookmakers will often us 0.5 spread lines. Bookmakers also strategically
make their lines to attract equal betting on each side. Bookmakers receive commission on
each bet of about 5 percent (oddsshark.com). If the public bets heavily on one side and
wins, the bookmaker is at risk. As a result, bookmakers are constantly changing the
spreads in order to hedge their bets, and prevent losses.
The spread lines are both the most popular and most representative of the NFL
market as a whole, which is why I choose to research this particular aspect of the NFL
betting market in length (Ge 2018). Specifically, I analyze the changes in the spreads, by
bookmakers, in order to hedge against possible loss. When bookmakers make their initial
spread, the only thing that they analyze is the quality of the two teams and conditions the
field will be played on. However, as the spread starts to change, it becomes more of a
combination of the information about the game, and how the public view the game
(oddsshark.com). Zuber et al (1985) serves as the baseline of the idea that the closing
spread is the best predictor of the game outcome because information is constantly
changing right up until game time, and earlier spreads may not incorporate these changes.
Far fewer economists cite the bookmakers "hedging" as reason to believe that the closing
spread is more of an indication of the public opinion, rather than quality of the teams
(Humphreys 2011).
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In this paper, I build off Paul and Weinbach (2011), who find that bettors in the
last hour are uninformed and find a profitable betting strategy betting against the majority
of last hour bettors. I analyze the changes in the spreads in order to draw conclusions on
the best indicators of the score, as well as look for a profitable betting strategy in this
market. I collect data on the opening and closing money lines on the day of NFL games
from the 2006-2014 seasons, and use an OLS third order regression model to predict the
point spreads on each game. I also collect information regarding temperatures and
conditions to look for profitable betting strategies in that light. I run OLS regressions of
the actual score difference on these different variables to test for efficiency. I compare the
results from the open and close spreads.
I also include variables for home and away favorites to analyze how successfully
home favorites can cover the spread because many analysts believe in "home field
advantage." Dare and Dennis (2011) find that home teams are often underestimated;
however, Aadland and Wever (2012) find that all favorites (home and away) are
overestimated. The inclusion of favorite information will help me analyze the
discrepancies in the literature regarding home field advantage and favorites.
My results show that bettors tend to overvalue information, as shifts in the spread
by one result in a less than one point shift in the actual score. My results also show that
the opening spread lines provide a more accurate prediction of game outcomes compared
to the closing line spreads. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
As a result, it may be profitable to bet against shifts in the spread on the final day of
betting. Furthermore, if the spread shifts in favor of the favorite, it is more profitable to
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bet on a home underdog than an away underdog. If the spread shifts in favor of the
underdog, it is more profitable to bet on the away favorite than the home favorite.
My findings show that early bettors are more informed than the bettors that
participate on the last day of betting. Despite a lack of information, bookmakers more
accurately predict the game outcomes than the bettors do, even after all information is
released leading up to game time. My model exposes inefficiencies in the NFL betting
market, provides proof that bettors perform worse than the 50 percent that bookmakers
aim to control, and provide a potential profitable betting strategy. My results suggest that
in order to make this market more efficient, bookmakers must release the information
they use to predict spreads because their predictions are better than average bettors.
Literature Review
Efficient Market Hypothesis
Fama (1970) develops an Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which states that
all stock prices accurately and fully represent all available information to the public. The
EMH often references the random walk of prices, which results in individual investors
not able to “beat the market” because no investor has access to information not available
to everyone. Fama (1970) assumes that current prices are only impacted by current
information, and not impacted by historical prices. Fama (1970) also assumes that all
information is available for free. Fama (1970) considers three diverse types of efficiency:
weak form, semi strong form, and strong form. Weak form refers to using historical
prices or return sequences, semi strong form refers to newly released information
(earnings, news reports, etc.), and strong form refers to “monopolistic information”
(insider information not available to everyone). Fama (1970) note that though there is a
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severe lack of information regarding insider information (and rules to regulate that kind
of trading), the first two forms give us strong insights to test the efficiency of a market.
Fama (1970) concludes, as stated earlier, that stock price history and previous return
sequences do not have any impact on the performance of the stock in the future. Fama
(1970) also finds that stock prices only reflect semi-strong form, and therefore reflect the
information currently released regarding the performance of the business.
There are several drawbacks to the EMH, though this literature should serve as
the basis for any efficient market analysis. Howden (2009) critiques the EMH on a few
accounts. Firstly, the literature assumes that all market information is interpreted in the
same way; in reality, there have been several investors to beat the market, and people
value different stocks in different ways. Secondly, he cites the transactions costs
associated with trading to take away from market efficiency. As a result, a profitable
investment strategy that "beats the market" must account for the commission costs
investors' pay. Thirdly, the time it takes to process a transaction often times results in a
discrepancy between the bid price and buy prices. The conclusion is that the EMH is too
unrealistic to apply to the financial markets. Despite these limitations, the EMH can still
serve as a basis for analyzing markets.
Unprofitable Betting Strategies
Applying the EMH to the NFL betting market, if the NFL betting market was
efficient, then there would be no profitable gambling strategies. Furthermore, since
gambling commission is around 5 percent, all betting strategies, in the long run, should
result in a net loss of about 5 percent. This is different from the short run, where
profitable betting strategies may appear successful. Zuber et al. (1985) analyze the
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efficiency of the NFL betting market in two ways. First, using traditional finance
literature, they use an equation that relates the actual point spread of the NFL game to the
Las Vegas Odds for the spread of the game. It is important to note that the Las Vegas
Odds do not reflect the bookkeeper’s initial prediction of the game’s outcome, but rather
uses all of the bets placed to reflect the optimal spread on the game. Just as stock prices
reflect the continuous trading by investors and the prices they are willing to pay, the Las
Vegas point spread represents the “collective judgement” of all bettors involved.
Therefore, the Las Vegas odds for the spread are closing spreads (the spread when betting
closes for a given game). If the market is efficient from the EMH, the coefficient under
OLS regressions should be 1; in other words, the relation between the Vegas odds and the
actual point spread should be a one to one ratio. Though Zuber et al. (1985) find a strong
correlation, the study must also test to see if the Las Vegas odds have no impact on the
actual results of the game (which intuitively makes sense). There is a stronger correlation
of the latter, implying that additional tests of efficiency must be conducted.
Zuber et al. (1985) perform a second test that aims to find a profitable betting
strategy, which if found, would mean there are some inefficiencies in the market. The
model is an OLS regression of the realized point difference of a certain game on a vector
of variables that includes yards rushing, yards passing, number of wins prior to the game,
fumbles, interceptions, number of penalties, proportion of passing places to total plays
and number of rookie players. The vector, similar to the realized point difference, is a
difference of the two team's statistics. The results show less than a five percent loss,
which shows inefficiencies in the market as stated above. The data analyzed is only over
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one season, so there are definitely significant restrictions on the results, but the model
serves as the basis to test NFL betting market efficiency.
Amundson et al. (2006) uses the same ideas as the literature before; however, the
variable of interest is the surface of the field the game is played on. The OLS regression
is of the realized point difference on the predicted point spread, using a dummy variable
to analyze if the field is grass or not. The other main variables are the overall record and
overall point spread for the season. The overall record and overall point spread play a
major role in the Las Vegas Odds spread decision, so the model can effectively analyze
whether the field effects the teams playing. Teams that are used to turf may have trouble
performing on grass. However, the results did not find a favorable betting strategy, which
means that NFL players do not have trouble making a transition to the different types of
fields. Amundson et al. (2006) considers a variety of different stadium characteristics,
including the size of the stadium, but none of these result in a profitable betting strategy.
As a result, it may help in a different context, but is not as relevant to my study.
Borghesi (2007) considers field conditions as well, as the study analyzes if teams
can’t perform in colder conditions than they are used to. The model uses the same
regression model as Amundson et al. (2006), but implements an additional variable that
analyzes the difference between the average temperatures in the team’s hometown verse
the average temperatures where the game is played. This is a very impactful study
because many bettors believe that teams from the south will struggle in the north. The
case is less believed when cold weather teams travel down south. The results show that
historically teams from warm weather areas struggle in cold temperatures, as there seems
to be a profitable betting strategy betting on teams from colder weather to do better. This
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is another variable that I am very interested in, and given the results, should include in
my analysis, as cold weather is both something that affects players and gamblers.
The literature that does not find profitable betting strategies use variables that
have already been included in the point spread set by Las Vegas, as offensive and
defensive statistics are considered before setting point spreads. However, this literature
does serve as the basis for all point spread analysis. Using my dataset, I will first run a
regression of realized point difference on point spread to test for market efficiency (a
coefficient of 1 indicates a perfectly efficient market). Then, I can include other
variables, such as type of field and temperature, to test for inefficiencies.
Favorites and Home Field Advantage
The previous section discusses variables that should already be factored in to the
point spreads, which is why the betting strategies prove not to be profitable. In this
section, I will look at variables that are popular amongst bettors, but may not be as much
of a part of the point spread, in order to find profitable betting strategies against the rest
of the market. The two most common variables that bettors tend to over-consider are
home field advantage (teams play better than their statistics may show at home) and
favorites (the better team has a much larger spread to cover).
A common betting strategy, especially present in the NFL, relates to the homeunderdog bias. The home-underdog bias is based on the idea that road favorites have
trouble covering the spread. Bettors tend to overvalue the success of the road favorites.
Dare and Dennis (2011) analyze this idea to see if there is a profitable betting strategy in
betting for home underdogs. To analyze this phenomena, the study looks at the NFL
seasons from 2005-2011. Dare and Dennis (2011) look at a mean forecast error. In other
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words, the study looks at the difference between the spread and the final result. Once the
forecasting error is determined, the study runs a simple t test against 0, to see where the
biases lie with respect to favorites and home teams. Their results find that bettors
underestimate the scoring potential of home teams, both favorites and underdogs, and the
results are statistically significant. As a result, there could be a profitable betting strategy
from betting on home teams, as the spreads are generally lower than the results indicate.
Aadland and Wever (2012) look at a different betting strategy, which is the idea
that favorites have trouble covering large spreads. As a result, Aadland and Wever (2012)
use a probit model to analyze how the favorites do at covering the spread. The model
regresses whether the home team wins the bet on home favorites, home underdogs and
creates an interaction variable between the two variables and the closing line. To analyze
the results, Aadland and Wever (2012) use the coefficients to predict the closing line that
will have a winning probability of 53 percent (which accounts for the implied
commission). The model predicts that underdogs are significantly underpriced, which
means that the spread on a game involving a significant underdog is usually higher than it
should be. Specifically, if the home team is the underdog, and the spread is above 6.5, a
profitable betting strategy can be implemented betting on the underdog. If the visiting
team is the underdog and the spread is above 10.5, there can be a profitable betting
strategy betting on the underdog. Bettors tend to bet on favorites, and as a result, the
spreads are a little higher than they should be. These conclusions prove that there may be
inefficiencies in the market because bettors tend to both favor the home team and bet on
the underdog. These two variables seem important to gamblers, and therefore should
definitely be considered when I do my analysis.
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Humphreys et al. (2013) critique the previous literature by using data from more
seasons. First, the study replicates the model from before in order to see how their
hypothesis holds up under a longer time interval. The results are similar to Dare and
Dennis (2011); however, Humphreys et al. (2013) find an interesting difference.
Humphreys et al. (2013) could reject the null hypothesis that the mean forecast error was
zero for away favorites, but could not reject the null hypothesis for home underdogs. The
study infers that the home-underdog favorite is only a small part of a much bigger story.
Similar to Aadland and Wever (2012), Humphreys et al. (2013) believe that bettors just
tend to favor teams that have been successful and therefor the favorite teams to cover the
spreads. Paul and Weinbach (2002) find that, in general, due to psychological reasons,
bettors tend to bet on the better teams. Using this theory, Humphreys et al. (2013)
propose a different model to analyze if this hypothesis was true. Using data from
sportsnights.com, they first look at betting percentages on favorites over the years in
question to see if their hypothesis is true. As expected, the percentages prove that bettors
tend to bet on favorites to cover the spread. It is important to note that these percentages
look at total bets places and are not effected by total money placed on bets (Las Vegas
sets their odds based on total money on each side of the bet, as mentioned before in order
to hedge their losses). However, Humphreys et al. (2013) claim the high percentages are
enough to hypothesize that there could be a bias. Instead of analyzing the mean forecast
error, the study looks at determining a profitable betting strategy by looking at the
percentage of bets that would win. Using the same data as Dare and Dennis (2011),
Humphreys et al. (2013) find no profitable betting strategy in betting against favorites
with this new approach. In conclusion, although bettors definitely prefer betting on
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favorites, the betting market correctly anticipates this outcome, and no profitable betting
strategies can be found through this type of strategy.
Clearly, bettors over-bet the favorites in the NFL. Davis et al. (2013) looks at
betting against the favorites in a different light. During week one of the NFL betting
season, most of the information regarding the spreads rely on the prior season. As a
result, the study looks at how teams fare during week one of the season that make the
playoffs the season before. Specifically, the study looks at teams that made the playoffs
competing against teams that did not make the playoffs to see if there is a bias towards
these teams. In the simulation, which looks at season 2004-2012, teams cover the spread
only 35.7 percent of the time. In other words, playoff teams do not cover the week one
spread against non-playoff teams. Though this paper makes interesting points, the EMH
is a long run theory, so looking at only one week of the season does not point out
inefficiencies in the market.
The majority of the literature shows that bettors prefer to bet on favorites and that
there could be a profitable betting strategy betting against the favorites. Specifically, the
literature shows that away teams have trouble covering and/or beating the spread. As a
result, I will include a dummy variable for the home team, favorite and home favorite and
create interaction variables to see if I can find statistically significant differences. With
this separation, I can analyze the "home underdog bias" and draw conclusions about how
successfully home and away favorites cover the spread.
Hot Hand
The "hot hand" belief refers to the idea that teams that have recent successes will
continue to succeed. The two competing theories are that bettors tend to overvalue recent
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successes and teams on winning streaks are more likely to succeed. The theory is first
associated with the NBA because many believe that shooters go on streaks. Camerer
(1989) and Brown and Sauer (1993) develop this model, claiming that bettors will bet
heavily for teams on winning streaks and against teams on losing streaks. As a result,
both studies find a profitable betting strategy, finding that the "mythical hot hand" skews
the point spreads for teams on streaks. Paul and Weinbach (2005) further this research by
finding a profitable betting strategy betting against teams on winning streaks.
The "hot hand" ideology can also be applied to the NFL betting market, as
spreads could be skewed towards teams on winning streaks and against teams on winning
streaks. Woodland and Woodland (2000) analyze this idea looking for the same
profitable betting strategy found in the NBA. In their study, there are no profitable betting
strategies betting against the streaks. The study concludes that there are no inefficiencies
due to hot hand bettors. However, this idea assumes that bookkeepers change the spreads
in order to attract equal bets on either side, and as a result the spreads on teams on
winning streaks are falsely high. Humphreys (2011) shatters that idea with a study that
proves bookkeepers actually take a stance on the games in order to exploit misinformed
bettors and produce higher returns. He did this by comparing the initial and final spreads
of games to the actual scores, and analyzed the returns the bookkeepers received. If
bookkeepers did keep "balanced books," then in the long run their returns should be
solely their commission. However, this study shows that bookkeepers in the NFL could
calculate spreads independent of bettors. If the initial spread results in the public betting
heavily on one side, then bookmakers miscalculate the initial spread, and must adjust the
spread to fit public opinion. Hence, bookmakers must use public opinion to calculate
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spreads (Bookmakers use the spread to even the betting field). In the same light,
bookmakers make excess profits from their initial line being misinterpreted by the public,
rather than the way they adjust the spreads.
Paul et al (2014) take this idea a step further by critiquing the previous literature.
Though there may not be a profitable betting strategy betting against teams on streaks,
there still could be evidence of bettors betting on streaks. Instead of looking at data on the
spreads, this study looks at betting percentages, so that even if the spread does not
account for hot hand betting, evidence can be shown that it exists. The study defines
winning streaks by how many wins consecutively against the spread a team has, leading
up to the game. Losing streaks, similarly, are defined by consecutive losses against the
spread leading up to the game. Using data from the 2005-2006 season and 2008-2009
season, the study finds that teams on winning streaks against the spread attract more bets
than other teams. The same was concluded for losing streaks. Therefore, initial spreads
often move in favor of "hot" teams and away from "cold" teams. The literature
aforementioned consistently refer to winning streaks against the spread; however, the
average bettor may only consider winning streaks outright when making their decisions.
As a result, analysis should be conducted in order to determine if traditional winning
streaks can either lead to a profitable betting strategy or expose "imbalanced books."
Though it seems there can be no profitable betting strategy betting against the hot
hand principle, there is evidence that bettors over bet teams with recent success.
Applying the ideas of the hot hand coupled with the "imbalanced bookkeepers" could
bring to light meaningful conclusions about the discrepancies between the "collective
judgment" mentioned earlier and the actual spread of these games.
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Last Hour of Betting
The last hour of betting is a relatively new and under-researched topic in betting.
The idea was first analyzed by Ottaviani and Sorenson (2008) in the horse betting market.
The idea was simple: the most informed bettors place their bets in the last hour of betting
because they wanted access to all available information before making their decision (as
shown the EMH). Through their simple analysis, bets placed within the last hour of
betting did exceptionally well supporting their hypothesis. The horse betting market
differs significantly from the NFL betting market because the odds on horses are not
released until after all bets are placed, so all bettors receive the same odds. In the NFL, all
bettors may have a slightly different spread because the spreads are updated
continuously. As a result, it makes sense that horse bettors wait until as close to post time
as possible because the odds at that time will be most predictable of the odds they will
receive. Despite this difference, NFL betting markets generally receive between 20 and
25 percent of their bets within the last hour of betting.
Miller and Rapach (2013) analyze the changes in the spread over the course of the
week in the 1972 season because of their theory that the spread becomes more accurate as
the week progresses. They separate their spreads into three categories; beginning of the
week, Tuesday's opening line and closing line. Miller and Rapach use OLS regression
analysis to compare the differences between the spreads and conclude that closing
spreads are the best indicator of outcome, Tuesday spreads are the second best, and
opening is the worst. Later, they use betting percentages and lag variables to put together
a more in depth analysis, but my data limits me from performing such analysis. This data
is also from only one season, and a season 45 years ago, so there are significant
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limitations to this study, but the simpler models comparing the different lines are relevant
and necessary for my analysis.
With such a high percentage of bets occurring in the last hour, Paul and Weinback
(2011) wanted to analyze whether bettors in the last hour were also more informed and
therefore could produce higher returns than the other bettors. After conducting an
analysis of the last hour of betting, looking for trends in the data, the study found that
bettors tend to prefer the same betting strategies found in most of the literature (betting
on favorites, home teams, etc.), which does mimic the betting of the general public. In
other words, not only does the last hour of betting not show evidence of informed trading,
but additionally the last hour of betting could be uninformed. As a result, the study looks
for a profitable betting strategy by betting against the bettors in the last hour. To do this,
the study looks at how the spread changes over the last hour of betting and sets up betting
simulations against the move in the spread. For example, if the spread increases over the
last hour, bettors in the last hour bet on the favorite, and therefore their simulation would
bet on the underdog. Through these simulations, the study did find a profitable betting
strategy, as 60 percent of the time, these bets are successful. The study has two notable
conclusions relevant to my study. Firstly, in an efficient market, the time the bet is placed
should have no impact on betting strategies because the spreads should accurately depict
all available information on the game, and therefore still should show no profitable
betting strategy. Secondly, if the bettors in the last hour are similar to the overall betting
market, there may be a profitable betting strategy simply betting against the public, which
would further back Humphreys (2011) claim that bookkeepers take a stance on games to
strengthen their earnings potential.
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Comparing the last hour of betting to the opening spreads could provide
information regarding two things. First, there could be a profitable betting strategy simply
betting against the public, which has been the common theme in every section. But
secondly, I can analyze the changes in the spread to determine if there exists "imbalanced
bookkeeping." Since the literature on last hour of betting is minimal, my paper hopes to
reexamine the variables mentioned before in this new light.
My paper will extend traditional literature of field conditions and temperature as
they relate to the spread by analyzing opening and closing spreads, and look for
discrepancies, as well as determine which line more accurately represent the game
outcome. After this, I will create additional variables for both home team and favorite in
order to further analyze the relationships between the spread and the realized point score.
Finally, I will analyze how changes in the spread effect the home team's chances of
covering the spread. Much of the previous literature analyzes these variables with respect
to closing spreads only, so I will be able to extend the analysis in to comparing opening
and closing spreads, and hope to find a profitable betting strategy using public opinion.

Data
In order to analyze the efficiency of the NFL Betting market, I will look at games
from the 2006-2014 NFL seasons and look for inefficiencies with respect to the type of
field, as well as the temperature. My data is divided up by season. My first data set comes
from armchairanalys.com. This data set includes dummy variables for grass fields, as
well as dome fields. The data set also includes the temperature at the start of every game.
The final scores for each game result are included as well (away-home). To distinguish
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my paper from previous literature, I compile an additional data set from
Pinnaclesports.com. This data set includes both opening and closing money lines on the
day of the game. In order to combine the data sets, I match up the games by season,
away team and home team. As a result, I omit all observations that do not include
opening money line, closing money line or the result of the game. I also omit all
preseason games because teams play preseason games differently than regular season
games to avoid injury. Since I have different sources of data, I omit all duplicate games,
and only use the first entry for each game used. There are a total of 9,142 observations
omitted. Despite the missing data points, I have 1,641 observations. My data is a time
series, as the total aggregate games are separated by season. I will analyze the differences
between opening and closing lines and spot any differences. Finally, I will look at the
popular vote to see if how the spread changes can provide a profitable betting strategy.
All of these models hope to spot inefficiencies in the market.
Zuber et al (1985) serve as the basis for NFL betting analysis, and much of the
literature to follow agree that the closing lines are the most accurate representation of the
game result. This can be attributed to last minute injuries and other information that may
not become available until minutes before kickoff. Miller and Rabach (2013) perform an
analysis of the 1972 NFL season that proves that as more information is analyzed and
more bettors participate in the market, the line shifts toward a better representation of the
game outcomes. However, Paul and Weinbach (2011) develop a new idea that as more
and more bettors place their bets, the line becomes a less accurate representation of the
game. Bookmakers study the NFL with much more scrutiny than the majority of bettors,
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so Paul and Weinback (2011) conclude that bettors actually disrupt the betting market. As
a result, I hope to analyze the conflicting theories using opening and closing line data.
Ge (2018), Cortis (2015), and Card and Dahl (2011) prove in their literature the
importance of the spread in the NFL, as a better indicator of the betting market than the
money line. Cortis (2015) explains that the spread attracts equal bets on either side, while
the money line does not. The spread is both easier to interpret, and more relevant for my
research. As a result, I must convert my money line data to spread data. Ge (2018)
outlines a model to convert money line data to the probability that the home team wins by
using a model from Cortis (2015). The model is relatively simple, but does provide an
easy way to determine the probability. Equation (1) shows the model below.
1 − 𝑝𝑖
) , 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 0.5
𝑝𝑖
(1) 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 =
𝑝𝑖
−100 (
) , 𝑝𝑖 > 0.5
{
}
1 − 𝑝𝑖
Using this equation, I convert all of my money lines to a probability that the home
+100 (

team will win. The next step, similar to Card and Dahl (2011) is to create a relationship
between the realized score difference in the game (away team points minus home team
points) and the probability that the home team will win. Since the relationship between
the point spread and the realized score difference is one-to-one for most data sets of high
volume, I will use the same relationship as point spread to probability in order to predict
the pregame point spreads. Card and Dahl (2011) claim that there is a third order
polynomial relation between the two variables; when the spread is within three points, a
change in the spread will have a linear relationship to probability. As the spread climbs
up above 10 points, changes in the point spread will have a smaller impact on the
probability of the game because on team is already so heavily favored. As a result, I come
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up with a simple third order regression model that relates realized score difference with
probability that the home team will win, as listed below in equation (2).
(2) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖2 + 𝛽3 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖3 + 𝐸𝑖
After running this regression, I predict the spreads at the beginning of the day and
at the close of betting for each game in my dataset. I have now calculated a predicted
point spread that I will use for the remainder of my methodology and results. Using the
predicted opening and closing spreads, I also create a dummy variable to describe if the
spread moves in favor of the home team, as well as a variable that measures the
difference between the opening and closing spread, which will be helpful in my analysis.
Table 1
Variable
Opening Spread
Closing Spread
Difference
Temperature

Observation
1,641
1,641
1,641
1,641

Mean
-1.981718
-1.981718
-1.984775
49.39038

St Deviation
5.83235
5.928049
15.31817
26.79876

Mine
-17.48295
-17.76627
-59
0

Table 1 shows some summary statistics of my data. The mean opening and
closing spread is -1.981718, which means that the home teams are favored more often
than the away teams. The values are also the same, which shows that there may not be a
large deviation between the opening and closing spreads. Additionally, the actual
difference in scores is -1.984775, which is slightly different, but the close relation shows
that the spread is a good indicator of the final score. Furthermore, the standard deviation
is much higher for the actual score than the spreads because bookmakers try not to favor
one teams heavily. A high standard deviation can also be an indicator of inefficiency;

22

Max
11.10715
12.2923
45
99

however, further regression analysis needs to be done in order to draw more meaningful
conclusions. The average temperature is 49.39038.
My data also includes information regarding the home team and favorites in the
game, as much of the literature consider these variables. As seen in Figure 1 below, the
betting market heavily favors the home team, as both bettors and bookmaker's alike value
the home field advantage. Furthermore, when the home team is favored initially, the
spread tends to increase in magnitude much more frequently than for the away favorites.
As a result, it is necessary to consider the differences between home and away favorites.
After taking a closer look at the data, I can get in to the methodology.

1200

1098
966

1000
800
600

676
586

544

400
174

200
0
Favorites

Shift in Spread
Home

Shift Toward
Favorite
Away

Figure 1

Lastly, my data includes hot hand information on both teams of each game in the
dataset. In other words, each team (away and home) of each game has a number for the
consecutive wins and losses over the last three games. I will use this data to analyze the
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effects of streaks on the outcomes of the game. Streaks do not go over multiple seasons,
so during week one, none of the teams are on streaks.
Methodology
I choose not to use a probit model, similar to Aadland and Wever (2012). Though
many bettors only care whether their bet wins or loses, the exact differences between the
spread and the realized point difference are important for large datasets. My methodology
comes from both Amundson et al. (2006) and Bhorghesi (2007), who take the simple
OLS regression model of realized score difference on point spread and add a dummy
variable for field condition, as well as a variable for temperature. The dummy variable
will be whether the stadium is a dome or not. I hypothesize that home teams will have an
advantage under dome conditions because they are used to it. Considering the difficulty
that comes with playing in cold weather, I hypothesize that road teams will struggle in
colder conditions. I will conduct the analysis on both initial lines and closing lines, as
well. Sudden changes in the temperature may result in bettors making bets against the
favorite to cover the spread. I also include a variable for fixed effects by season in my
regression, so that the data is analyzed on a per season basis. Since there may be home
team fixed effects as well, I will also include a variable for home team fixed effects. I
have included the two new models below.
(3) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + τ𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡
(4) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡
For each game 𝑖 in season 𝑡, if 𝛽1 is greater than 1, the favorites tend to cover the
spread, as a one point increase/decrease in the spread results in more than a one point
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increase/decrease in the realized score difference. If 𝛽1 is less than one, the favorites tend
to not cover the spread as a one point increase/decrease in the spread result in a less than
one point increase/decrease in the realized score difference. Additionally, I will run two
more regressions including a variable for temperature squared, as Borghesi (2007)
outlines is an additional test for how temperature effects the score. The two models are
listed below.
(5) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡2 + τ𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡
(6) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡2 + τ𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡

Next, I will conduct my analysis on the "home field advantage," as many bettors
and bookmaker's alike feel that teams play better at home. I have a dummy variable for
when the home team is the favorite. I will include this new variable, and then create
interaction variables between the home favorite variable and the variable of interest
(spread). In this case, I am adding two variables to equations (3) and (4). Before running
this regression, I must test for collinearity, as there is a high chance that there could be
collinearity between the spread variable and the two new variables. In the case of the
home favorite model, there does exist collinearity, so I drop the interaction variable. My
new model regresses the realized point difference on temperature, dome nand the dummy
variable for home favorite.
(7) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡
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(8) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡
I hypothesize, similar to Dare and Dennis (2011) and Aadland and Wever (2012),
bettors tend to underestimate the ability of the home team to score. Therefore, I expect
the coefficient 𝑏1 in both equation (5) and (6) to be greater than 1, indicating that the
home favorites tend to cover the spread more often than otherwise. I also expect the
coefficient to be greater than 𝑏1 from equations (3) and (4), indicating that home favorites
cover the spread more often than overall favorites do.
Next, I will explore models that incorporate a dummy variable for when the home
team is an underdog and use a similar model to before. With this dummy variable and
interaction variable addition, there is no collinearity between the additional variables and
spread, so I can create these models as shown below.
(9) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡
(10) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡
For equations (7) and (8), staying in line with the "home underdog bias," I
hypothesize away favorites teams to have trouble covering the spread, so 𝑏1 should be
less than 1. I also expect 𝑏1 to be lower than 𝑏1 from equations (3) and (4).
I will also analyze the effects of recent success on the scores of the games by
including a variable for streak. In order to do so, I will include a fixed effects variable for
the streak. The streak variable will be 0 if the team is not on a winning streak, 1 if the
team is on a one game winning streak, 2 if the team is on a two game winning streak, and
3 if the team is on a three game winning streak. I will then do the same for both the home
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and away team, for winning and losing streaks, and for opening and closing spread. The
models will be the same as equations (3) and (4); however, there will be hot hand fixed
effects. I hypothesize that bettors will overvalue teams on winning streaks and
undervalue teams on losing streaks. As a result, I predict a profitable betting strategy
betting against the "hot hand" and with the "cold hand."
Finally, I will analyze how the change in the point spread (from open to close)
effects the realized point difference. In order to do this, I will run a standard two tail t test
between the open and closed coefficients in each of the six equations to see if their
difference is significant. The equations for the t statistic is listed below. The number of
observations is the same for open and close, so 𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 = 𝑛𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 = 𝑛
Null Hypothesis: 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 = 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁
Alternative Hypothesis: 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 ≠ 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁
(11)

𝑡=

𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 − 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁
2
2
√(𝑆𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 + 𝑆𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 )
𝑛

Results
Table 2
VARIABLES
OpenSpread
(𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 )

(3)
Difference
0.881***
(0.0647)

ClosingSpread
(𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 )
Dome
Temperature

(4)
Difference

0.886***
-1.576
(2.612)
-0.00431
(0.0202)
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(0.0631)
-1.796
(2.605)
-0.00624
(0.0200)

Constant

0.00493
(2.949)

0.353
(2.946)

Season FE
Yes
Yes
Team FE
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,641
1,641
R-squared
0.174
0.178
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2 shows the results from equation (3) and (4). The opening and closing
spread coefficients are significant at the 1% level. A change in the opening spread by one
point results in a 0.881 change in the actual score and a change in the closing spread by
one point results in a 0.886 difference in the actual score. The closing spread is a slightly
better indicator of actual score. The coefficients of the dome and temperature variables
are both positive, but insignificant. The t statistic for the difference in opening and
closing spread is approximately 0.056, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁
from equation (3) equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 from equation (4) at the 5% level.
Table 3
VARIABLES
OpenSpread
(𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 )

(5)
Difference
0.880***
(0.0647)

ClosingSpread
(𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 )
Dome
Temperature
tempsq
Constant

(6)
Difference

0.885***
(0.0631)
-0.941
(2.690)
0.0376
(0.0708)
-0.000455
(0.000756)
-0.678
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-1.341
(2.674)
0.0237
(0.0700)
-0.000325
(0.000749)
-0.136

(3.066)

(3.052)

Season FE
Yes
Yes
Team FE
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,641
1,641
R-squared
0.174
0.178
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3 shows the results from equations (5) and (6), which includes a
temperature squared term. Once again, the coefficients of opening and closing spreads are
statistically significant at the 1% level, while the dome and temperature coefficients are
not statistically significant. A change in the opening spread by one point results in a
change in the actual score of 0.88 and the change in the closing spread by one point
results in a 0.885 change in the actual score. The t statistic for the difference between
opening and closing spread is still 0.056, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that
𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 from equation (3) equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 from equation (4).

Table 4
VARIABLES

(7)
Difference

OpenSpread (𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 )

(8)
Difference

0.788***
(0.104)
-1.417
(1.236)

HomeFavoritesOpen
ClosingSpread (𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 )
HomeFavoritesClose
Dome

-1.403
(2.607)
-0.00377
(0.0201)
0.608

Temperature
Constant
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0.731***
(0.101)
-2.436*
(1.246)
-1.674
(2.600)
-0.00600
(0.0199)
1.535

(3.023)
Yes
Yes

Season FE
Team FE

(3.052)
Yes
Yes

Observations
1,641
1,641
R-squared
0.174
0.180
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 shows the results from equations (7) and (8). As with the previous
models, the spread coefficients are statistically significant and the dome and temperature
coefficients are not. In equation (7), the coefficient for the dummy variable is
insignificant and negative in magnitude and in equation (8), the coefficient is significant
at the 10% level and negative as well. When the home team is the favorite at the start of
game day, the actual score difference is 1.5 less than otherwise and 2.43 less when the
home team is the favorite when betting closes. The t statistic for the difference in opening
and closing spread lines is well above 3.2, so we can reject the null hypothesis that
𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 from equations (7) and (8) at the 1% level.

Table 5
VARIABLES

(9)
Difference

OpenSpread (𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 )

(10)
Difference

0.811***
(0.114)
1.758
(1.432)
-0.125
(0.264)

AwayFavoritesOpen
AFOpenSpread
ClosingSpread (𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 )

0.770***
(0.110)
3.032**
(1.485)
-0.210

AwayfavoritesClose
AFCloseSpread
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Dome

-1.440
(2.610)
-0.00371
(0.0201)
-0.668
(2.989)
Yes
Yes

Temperature
Constant
Season FE
Team FE

(0.264)
-1.784
(2.609)
-0.00626
(0.0200)
-0.621
(2.966)
Yes
Yes

Observations
1,641
1,641
R-squared
0.174
0.180
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5 shows the results from equations (9) and (10). The coefficients of the
spreads are statistically significant at the 1% level. The dome, temperature, and the
interaction variables are not significant. The away favorite dummy variable is statistically
significant at the 5% level in the closing spread model, but insignificant in the opening
spread model. When the away team is the favorite at the start of game day, the spread is
1.758 higher than otherwise and when the away team is the favorite at the end of betting,
the spread is 3.032 higher than otherwise. The t statistic for the difference in opening and
closing spread lines is well above 3.2, so we can reject the null hypothesis that 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁
equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 from equations (7) and (8) at the 1% level.
Table 6
VARIABLES
OpenSpread
Dome
Temperature
1.HomeLoseStreak

(12)
Difference

(13)
Difference

(14)
Difference

(15)
Difference

0.882***
(0.0670)
0.212
(1.118)
0.0193
(0.0172)
0.0226

0.880***
(0.0669)
0.210
(1.114)
0.0190
(0.0172)

0.875***
(0.0676)
0.261
(1.117)
0.0195
(0.0172)

0.888***
(0.0672)
0.252
(1.117)
0.0195
(0.0172)
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2.HomeLoseStreak
3.HomeLoseStreak

(0.860)
-0.737
(1.132)
0.638
(1.095)

1.HomeWinStreak

-0.102
(0.858)
0.591
(1.153)
0.394
(1.154)

2.HomeWinStreak
3.HomeWinStreak
1.AwayLoseStreak

0.872
(0.822)
-0.0506
(1.148)
0.727
(1.255)

2.AwayLoseStreak
3.AwayLoseStreak
1.AwayWinStreak
2.AwayWinStreak
3.AwayWinStreak
Constant
Season FE
Team FE
Observations
R-squared

0.227
(1.493)
Yes
Yes

0.198
(1.483)
Yes
Yes

-0.0206
(1.484)
Yes
Yes

1,641
1,641
1,641
0.149
0.149
0.149
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.696
(0.883)
-0.537
(1.118)
0.169
(1.120)
0.394
(1.487)
Yes
Yes
1,641
0.149

Table 6 shows the results from the hot hand model for the opening spread. In this
model, the coefficient is much closer to 1 than the previous models, but the streak data
does not provide any statistically significant coefficients. I expect teams on winning
streaks to do better and teams on losing streaks to do worse, so the signs for home
winning streak and away losing streak to be negative, and the signs for away winning
streak and home losing streak to be positive. However, the results show home teams on
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two or three game winning streaks to favor the away team and away teams on one or
three game winning streaks to favor the away team as well. When the home team is on a
two game losing streak or the away team is on a one or two game winning streak, the
results show the home team to have an advantage. Given the insignificance of the results
coupled with the randomness of the signs of the coefficients, I conclude that the hot hand
does not provide an opportunity for a profitable betting strategy.

Table 7
VARIABLES
ClosingSpread
Dome
Temperature
1.HomeLoseStreak
2.HomeLoseStreak
3.HomeLoseStreak
1.HomeWinStreak
2.HomeWinStreak
3.HomeWinStreak

(16)
Difference

(17)
Difference

(18)
Difference

(19)
Difference

0.888***
(0.0658)
0.139
(1.119)
0.0165
(0.0172)
0.0368
(0.862)
-0.740
(1.125)
0.603
(1.092)

0.886***
(0.0657)
0.140
(1.116)
0.0161
(0.0172)

0.880***
(0.0663)
0.196
(1.119)
0.0168
(0.0172)

0.892***
(0.0659)
0.187
(1.118)
0.0168
(0.0172)

-0.126
(0.855)
0.634
(1.150)
0.505
(1.148)

1.AwayLoseStreak

0.957
(0.817)
-0.0240
(1.142)
0.722
(1.250)

2.AwayLoseStreak
3.AwayLoseStreak
1.AwayWinStreak

-0.795
(0.878)
-0.436

2.AwayWinStreak
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3.AwayWinStreak
Constant
Season FE
Team FE
Observations
R-squared

0.408
(1.498)
Yes
Yes

0.368
(1.485)
Yes
Yes

0.132
(1.488)
Yes
Yes

1,641
1,641
1,641
0.154
0.153
0.154
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1.120)
0.174
(1.123)
0.571
(1.489)
Yes
Yes
1,641
0.154

Table 7 shows the results from the hot hand closing spreads model. The results
are very similar to the opening spread model, so I draw the same conclusion that the "hot
hand" does not provide opportunity for profitable betting strategy. The t statistic between
the opening and closing spreads is less than 1, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that
𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 .
Discussion
Equations (3) and (4) are standard regressions looking at the relationship between
the actual score difference on open spread/close spread, dome and temperature, and are
displayed in Table 2. The coefficients of interest are the values of 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 .
Both 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 , at the 1% level, do not equal the value of 1 that the EMH
predicts. As a result, there are clearly inefficiencies in the market. Additionally, the t
statistic between 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 shows that I fail to reject the null hypothesis that
𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 = 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 . Both values are less than one, which means that changes in the spread
are overvalued, and the actual score difference changes less than the spread does. One
possible explanation from general finance theory is that markets often overreact to
information, as Howden (2009) outlines. When the spread changes, it is a result of new
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information, which causes bettors to overreact, and shift the spread much more than it
should shift. As a result, the actual final score is less sensitive to additional information
than the spreads.
The 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 coefficient,𝑏2 , is positive, which would indicate that a dome actually
favors the away team (recall that spreads are calculated by away score-home score),
while holding all other variables constant. However, the values are insignificant. The
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 coefficients,𝑏3 , are positive as well, which means that increases in
temperature favor the away team and decreases in temperature favor the home team,
while holding all other variables constant. These coefficients are statistically significant,
and agree with the results from Borghesi (2007), as teams from warm weather struggle in
colder conditions. The small magnitude of the coefficient signifies that only dramatic
changes in temperature can impact the score of the game. As Borghesi (2007) describes, a
change from 60 degrees to 10 degrees gives the home team an unbelievable advantage,
and my model predicts a decrease in the 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 by 1 (away-home).
Equations (5) and (6) include a temperature squared variable in order to further
analyze temperature as an indicator of the final score. The results are insignificant and
small in magnitude as with the first two models, so no significant conclusions can be
drawn for these results. As a result, temperature is not a great indicator of final scores.
Equations (7) and (8) incorporate the 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 variable to analyze how
having a home favorite's effect the spread. The results are shown in Table 4. The 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖
and 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 coefficients have similar results to before, so the same conclusions
can be drawn from this model. The 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 values are significant and much
less than one, which implies, similar to previous models, that bettors tend to overreact to
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newly released information, and as a result changes in the spread are more dramatic than
the change in the actual score. In this model, I can reject the null hypothesis that the
𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 are equal. Furthermore, the opening spread lines are better indicators
of the actual score than the closing spread line, which contradicts Zuber et al. (1985). One
possible explanation for this is the idea that earlier in the day, the bettors are bookmakers
and more informed bettors. As the day progresses, more casual bettors that do not spend
as much time tracking spreads enter the market, which causes the spread to shift away
from the actual scores. The dummy variable has a negative coefficient, which is in line
with my prediction because when the home team is the favorite the score should decrease
and when the away team is the favorite, the spread should increase. The closing spread
model has a higher coefficient, which is significant at the 10% level, which means that
the favorite has a better chance to cover the spread if the team is favorited at the close of
betting than at the start of betting. The fact that the coefficient is statistically significant
and less than one does give merit to the idea that favorites are often overestimated, as
Aadland and Wever (2012) discuss. Since 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 is less than 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 , bettors on the day
of play significantly overestimate the home team's ability to score. However, comparing
these results to the results in Table 2, it is clear that bettors overestimate a team's ability
to score regardless of who the favorite/home team is.
Equations (9) and (10) incorporate a variable for when the home team is the
underdog to analyze how home underdogs effect the spread. The results are shown in
Table 5. The 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 coefficients have similar results to before, so
the same conclusions can be drawn from this model. However, a number of interesting
conclusions can be drawn from the new additions to the model. The model predicts that
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increases in the spread make it tougher to cover the spread and decreases in the spread
make it easier to cover the spread, which intuitively makes sense. The open spread model
suggests that a one point increase in the 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 results in an additional 0.12
decrease in the 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 when the away team is favored, as opposed to when
the home team is favored. In other words, away favorites are less likely to cover the
spread when the spread increases and more likely to cover the spread when the spread
decreases (since 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 = 0.81 and 𝑏5𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 = −0.12). This coefficient is insignificant.
The close spread model predicts similar outcomes. In the closing spread model, an
increase in 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 by one results in an additional decrease of 0.21 in
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 as compared to home favorites. This coefficient is statistically
insignificant as well.
The test statistic, when comparing 𝑏5𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 to 𝑏5𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 , proves at the 1% level that
we can reject the null hypothesis, as with the other previous model. Since the two values
under analysis are statistically significant as well, there is a discrepancy between the
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 that is statistically significant. A shift in the spread
from open to close, as per EMH, implies that additional information is released on the
day of the game, causing one team to have an advantage over the previous spread.1
Generally, on the last day of betting, uninformed bettors must overreact to this newly
released information, which shifts the spread much more than it should. Using Table 4 to
analyze away favorites and Table 5 to analyze home favorites, I can use statistically
significant information, as the dummy variable for 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 and

New advantages/disadvantages can range anywhere from injury updates and weather changes to
bookmaker's trying to hedge their bets to do the increases frequency of betting on one side.
1
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𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 is equal to 0. Specifically, when the away team is the favorite, the
spread shifts much more than when the home team is the favorite. In other words, if the
spread shifts toward the favorite, away favorites have a tougher time covering a larger
spread than home favorites. If the spread shifts toward the underdog, then home favorites
have a tougher time covering the spread than the away favorites do. One possible theory
for this phenomenon comes from a combination of Dare and Dennis (2011) and Aadland
and Wever (2012). When the bettors shift the spread towards the favorite, Dare and
Dennis (2011), Aadland and Wever (2012) and my results show that away teams struggle
to cover the spread on the road and home favorites have a much better chance to cover
high spreads than away favorites. When the bettors shift the spread towards the underdog
due to newly released information, my results show the spread will shift more toward the
home underdog than the away underdog, so away favorites will cover the spread more
often than home favorites. In other words, home underdogs are overestimated compared
to away underdogs, whereas, away favorites are overestimated compared to home
favorites.
It is important to note that, overall, bettors still overreact to information, as the
coefficients of opening and closing spreads are less than one. The results match the
results from Paul and Weinbach (2011), who also find a profitable betting strategy betting
against the public. Their results look at the last hour, instead of the last day. As a result, a
profitable betting strategy can be implemented by betting against the general public on
the last day of betting because bettors overreact to newly released information and bettors
that participate on the last day are less informed than previous bettors. The results from
Table 4 and 5 show that if the spread shifts toward the favorite, betting on the home
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underdog is more profitable than betting on the away underdog; if the spread shifts
toward the underdog, then it is more profitable to bet on the away favorite than the home
favorite.
Another theory that could prove this anomaly, is the theory of imbalanced books.
Humphreys (2011) develops a model that proves that bookmakers make additional
income to the commission charges, and infers that bookkeepers may not fully adjust the
spreads to convey the "collective judgement," that it should. In the case of the spread
shifting, bookkeepers could over adjust the spread based on their own opinions more than
the opinion of the public, with the hope of capitalizing on public misconceptions. No
matter which theory is accurate, the model does point to inefficiencies in the NFL betting
market.
Table 6 and Table 7 show the results from the hot hand models, which analyze
how teams on streaks do in comparison to teams not on a streak. The coefficients of
opening and closing spread are the same and much closer to one, which shows that the
betting market is inefficient as it relates to teams on streaks. Additionally, the coefficients
of the streak variables are not significant, small in magnitude, and vary drastically in
sign, which indicates that a team's past performance does not impact future performance,
so there are no profitable betting strategies related to the hot hand.
Limitations and Extensions
My study uses money line data to predict the spreads of the games, as opposed to
the actual spreads of the games. As a result, there could be some bias, as a model to
predict spreads will accurately represent an efficient market much more than the actual
spreads might. The models use the EMH to help predict spreads, so there could be
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additional inefficiencies that I could not point out. Additionally, I did omit 9,142
observations from my data set, and though it was random and due to an access issue, this
can significantly skew my results as well. I also do not have any information regarding
betting volume, so I was only able to analyze bettor popularity by the changes in the
spread over the last day. A closer look at popularity could also bring light to whether
bookmakers are using imbalanced books to maximize their profits. There are many injury
updates and additional factors that result in a change in the spread. My data also spans the
last day of betting; however, literature proves that 25 percent of the bets in the NFL occur
in the last hour of betting, but I am not able to analyze the last hour of betting. I also use
an OLS regression model, which has many benefits; however, many bettors are much
more interested in whether the bet wins or loses. As a result, some bettors favor the probit
model, which does not account for the excess points a team covers the spread by. Lastly,
there is a potential for type I error, which occurs if I reject the null hypothesis when the
null hypothesis is true. The likelihood is very rare, considering my t statistics were above
50, but it does need to be mentioned.
Despite my papers limitations, the paper provides important insights that can lead
to future research. The new idea that shows opening lines as a better indicator of the
score than closing lines can be used in many studies in the future. Studies can run betting
simulations betting on the shift in the spread to overestimate the shift in the outcome.
Since the difference in the coefficients of opening and closing spreads have a very low
magnitude, additional research can provide information on the magnitude of a spread
shift that provides a profitable betting strategy, as well as the magnitude of the spread
prior to the shift. Both of these factors will be relevant in putting together a profitable
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betting strategy.
There is a plethora of literature analyzing the relationship between home field
advantages and favorites. Some literature proves that bettors underestimate the ability of
the home team to score. Some literature proves that bettors bet on favorites more often
than not. Some literature proves that severe underdogs receive more praise than they
deserve (and hence the spread is lower than it should be). Either way all the literature is
inconclusive. Since my model is OLS, applying the probit or mean difference error
methods I outline in my literature review coupled with this new idea of comparing
opening lines to closing lines could provide additional information as well. My paper
should pave the way for additional studies to really analyze the changes in the spread
throughout the betting season, and potentially expose inefficiencies in the NFL betting
market, as my paper has. Combining the home field advantage and favorite betting
strategies with the last day (or last hour) of betting might show statistically significant
simulations.
The hot hand biases may be more noticeable earlier in the week, as bettors could
tend to value past performance when it is much more recent. Further research using
spreads from earlier in the week could provide more meaningful conclusions to the idea
of the teams on streaks. Since this paper suggests that many bettors are uninformed,
bettors may value how the team has been performing overall, as opposed to against the
spread. So additional research could also analyze teams on streaks could provide better
results than streaks against the spread.
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Conclusion
This paper utilizes money line data from the opening and closing of betting on
game day to analyze discrepancies between opening and closing line data. I convert the
money lines to spread lines using literature. Most literature and theory provide evidence
that the closing lines are a better indicator of the game outcome, due to late releases of
injury and other information. This paper finds that bettors tend to overreact to newly
released information, as spreads move more than the actual scores will move in the NFL
betting market. This paper also finds significant discrepancies between the opening and
closing spreads. The results indicate that the opening spreads have a much greater
correlation to the actual scores than the closing spreads, which contradicts much of the
previous literature. As a result, the market is inefficient. Bookmakers and other gamblers
that place their bets early in the week will be more informed because they track the
spreads early and often. On the last day of betting, more uninformed casual bettors enter
the market, who are less successful in predicting final scores. The results suggest that the
markets overreact to changes in information. In the stock market, investors tend to
overreact to shocks, which is why dramatic changes in the market correct itself over time.
Since the NFL betting market does not have time to correct itself, as eventually the game
takes place, maybe the market does not have time to fully correct the overreaction. If
bookmakers and the media distribute the information more efficiently, the market itself
will run more efficiently. The inefficiency and lack of bettor awareness provide insight in
to why sports gambling remains illegal in many places. The unpredictability in sports,
often due to exogenous factors, does not mirror other markets and can explain the
inability of bettors to succeed. Until then, there can be a profitable betting strategy by
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betting against the shift in the spread, as the shift in the score is predicted to be less than
the shift in the spread. Furthermore, if the shift moves toward a favorite, it is more
profitable to bet on a home underdog than an away underdog. If the shift moves toward
the underdog, it is more profitable to bet on the away favorite than the home favorite.
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